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******************** 
) 
TOM N. SOTER and . . 
HELEN P. SOTER, ) 
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) 
Plaintiffs • . 
and ) 
Appellants, . .. 
) 
-vs- • . 
) 
PAUL C. BO~CE and I 
BAZEL BOYCE, his ) 
wife, .. . 
) 
Defendants = 
. 
and ) 
Respondents. . . 
) -
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Honorable Stewart M;; JJa'r'' 
. . ... :~~~ 
* * * * ** "'*****"''**'***'*• ;:\,> . -~ . . ,.. .. :: ... '. ·..z: -'... . 
George H. Searle 
2805 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
********************* 
TOM N. SOTER and 
HELEN P. SOTER, 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs 
and 
Appellants, 
-vs-
PAUL C. BOYCE and 
HAZEL BOYCE, his 
wife, 
Defendants 
and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 11119 
********************* 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
********************* 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action by appellants, 
(hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) 
against Wasatch Development Corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as Wasatch) 
2 
for specific performance or damages for 
breach of contract, against Paul C. 
Boyce and Hazel Boyce (hereinafter re-
f erred to as defendants) for interfer-
ence with contract, and for a court 
order declaring the delivery of a quit 
claim deed by plaintiffs' attorney null 
and void. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Upon motion of appellees and after 
making findings of fact the Trial Court 
concluded that plaintiffs' complaint as 
to defendants should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek a reversal of 
the judgment below and then for remand 
3 
of the case to the Trial Court for 
further proceedings and for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs on September 2, 1963 
purchased from Convest Corporation the 
Castel Apartments under a uniform real 
estate contract and Convest Corporation 
subsequently conveyed its interest in 
said property to defendants. 
Plaintiffs became delinquent on the 
payments due under the terms of the con-
tract and on September 17, 1965, entered 
into a written agreement with defendants 
(R. 67} wherein plaintiffs were given 
six months to bring the payments current, 
sell or refinance the apartment house; 
and if plaintiffs failed so to do, a 
quit claim deed to the subject property 
4 
was to be delivered to defendants by 
plaintiffs' attorney (R. 18 at paragraph 
8). Pursuant to this agreement plain-
tiffs found a buyer and on February 8, 
1966, an earnest money agreement (R. 62) 
was executed by plaintiffs as sellers 
and Wasatch as buyer, and plaintiffs 
thereafter gave a quit claim deed to 
Wasatch. 
After February 8, 1966, defendants 
met with representatives of Wasatch and 
induced them to breach its contract with 
plaintiffs (R. 62) , to not deal further 
with plaintiffs but to deal with defen-
dants (R. 41); and as a result thereof, 
Wasatch did not perform its agreement 
with plaintiffs to pay plaintiffs con-
sideration valued at $32,000.00 for their 
interest in the Castel Apartments and 
5 
piaintif f s were unable to remedy their 
default under the uniform real estate 
contract. 
As provided in the agreement between 
plaintiffs and defendants (R. 67) , plain-
tiffs had executed a quit claim deed (R. 
84) and delivered the same to their 
attorney, Richard L. Bird, Jr. When plain-
tiffs became aware that defendants had 
interfered with the contract between plain-
tiffs and Wasatch and that defendants had 
prevented performance by Wasatch resulting 
in plaintiffs not being able to remedy 
the default above mentioned, plaintiffs 
contacted their attorney and instructed 
him not to deliver the deed (R. 84) to 
defendants. Plaintiffs' attorney, however, 
disregarded the instruction and delivered 
said deed to defendants. 
6 
PLAINTIFFS' POSITION 
The Trial Court's decision should 
be reversed and the case remanded for 
further proceedings and for trial on the 
following grounds: 
1. Plaintiffs pleaded a sound 
claim against defendants in inter-
ference with contract and plain-
tiffs are entitled to present their 
evidence in support thereof to the 
trier of fact. 
2. Plaintiffs pleaded a valid 
claim to show that the delivery by 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. of the quit 
claim deed to the subject property 
was invalid and are entitled to 
present their evidence in support 
thereof to the trier of fact. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS PLEADED A SOUND CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS BASED ON THE TORT OF 
INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT. 
A party to a contract has a cause of 
action against a person who has procured 
a breach of that contract by the other 
party thereto, and the theory of this 
doctrine is that the right to performance 
of a contract is a property right which 
is entitled to protection. KIANG v. 
STRYCULA, 231 Cal. App. 2d 809, 42 Cal, R. 
338 (1965); GRAFF ~WHITEHOUSE, 71 Ill. 
App. 2 412, 219 N.E.2d 128 (1966). 
This doctrine had its beginning when 
LUMLEY v. GYE, 2 Ell. & B. 216, 118 Eng. 
Reprint, 749 (1853), was decided. In that 
case it was found that a singer was under 
8 
contract to sing at the plaintiff's 
theatre and was induced by the defendant, 
who operated a rival theatre, to break 
her contract with the plaintiff and the 
Court decided that such interference was 
tortious and actionable at law. The 
cases and texts that follow set forth the 
following as prima facia elements of the 
tort of interference with contract: 
1. Existence of a contract, 
2. Knowledge by defendant of the 
existence of the contract, 
3. Intentional interference by 
defendant, 
4. Causal relationship between 
the contract breach and the 
interference by defendant, 
5. Damages suffered by plaintiffs. 
GAMMON v. FEDERATED MILK PRODUCERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 11 Utah 2d 421, 360 P2d 
9 
1018 (1961); BUNNELL ::'.:...:..BILLS, 13 Utah 
2d 83, 368 P2d 597 (1962); 84 A.L.R. 43; 
26 A.L.R.2d 1247; Restatement, Torts §766 
(1939). 
In their complaint at paragraph 17, 
(R. 57) plaintiffs have alleged that a 
contract was entered into between plain-
tiffs and Wasatch; in paragraph 18 (R. 
58) they have alleged that appellees in-
tentionally and willfully interferred with 
said contract causing Wasatch to breach 
the same; in paragraph 19 (R. 58) they 
alleged that as a result of said inter-
ference by defendants, Wasatch failed to 
perform its contract and plaintiffs were 
damaged thereby. 
In view of the history and the cases 
developing the subject tort, plaintiffs 
submit that each element of the tort has 
10 
been pleaded and, therefore, that a claim 
for relief has been stated. Responsive 
to the complaint, appellees did not admit 
nor deny the allegations thereof but filed 
a motion (R. 73) asking that the complaint 
be dismissed and in support of their motion, 
filed an affidavit (R. 75). 
The Trial Court viewed defendants' 
motion as one made pursuant to Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) and treated it 
as one for summary judgment. The record 
at that point contained plaintiffs' com-
plaint (R. 55) which set forth a claim 
against appellees for interference with 
contract and appellants answers to inter-
rogatorie~ (R. 41) which stated in detail 
the acts of appellees which appellants 
rely upon as evidence of interference. The 
record contains nothing to challenge the 
11 
allegations of the complaint nor the 
answers to interrogatories. 
Defendants' affidavit (R. 75) in no 
way contradicts, denies or challenges 
plaintiffs' claim; the most that it and 
the attached exhibits do is set forth the 
steps followed to divest plaintiffs of 
their interest in the subject property. 
The fact that plaintiffs have conveyed 
their interest to Wasatch is in no way 
fatal to plaintiffs' claim against defen-
dants because plaintiffs' claim is not 
based upon having an interest in the 
subject property but upon their right to 
have Wasatch perform its contract which 
right was interferred with by defendants. 
II. WASATCH BREACHED ITS AGREEMENT 
WITH PLAINTIFFS. 
The Trial Court entered its order 
12 
and with it findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law (R. 99) but therein did not 
specify the reason or reasons for the dis-
missal and plaintiffs can, therefore, only 
speculate as to the reasons for the Court's 
ruling and then attempt to rebut those 
reasons. 
Having been aware of the facts that 
plaintiffs had conveyed their interest in 
the subject property to Wasatch (R. 74), 
the Trial Court may have considered the 
transaction between plaintiffs and Wasatch 
completed and, therefore, may have decided 
that if the contract was performed plain-
tiffs had no claim against defendants for 
induced breach of contract. If the Court 
reached its decision based upon this rea-
soning, the same is erroneous because even 
though plaintiffs executed a quit claim 
13 
deed, Wasatch did not and has not tendered 
to plaintiffs the agreed consideration; 
therefore, a breach occurred. These facts 
have been pleaded by plaintiffs (R. 58) 
and nothing in the record contradicts 
them. The complaint (R. 55) has not been 
answered by Wasatch, and defendants' affi-
davit (R. 75) does not address itself to 
this issue. For purposes of this appeal, 
therefore, the allegations stating a breach 
by Wasatch must be viewed as being true 
and, therefore, this essential element of 
the tort of induced breach of contract is 
not lacking. 
III. THE DELIVERY OF THE QUIT CLAIM 
DEED BY PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY TO DEFENDANTS 
WAS INEFFECTIVE. 
Another possible basis for dismiss-
ing plaintiffs' complaint may have been 
14 
the fact that a qui~ claim deed to the 
subject property (R. 84) was delivered 
to defendants by Richard L. Bird, Jr., 
plaintiffs' former attorney. 
The basic reason why this fact could 
not support a summary dismissal is because, 
as above mentioned, plaintiffs have a claim 
against defendants, not because they have 
an interest in the Castel Apartments, but 
because they have a property right in the 
performance of a contract by Wasatch, which 
right was interferred with by defendants. 
Further reason why this fact is not 
detrimental to plaintiffs' claim is be-
cause the said plaintiffs' attorney deliv-
ered the quit claim deed (R. 84) to defen-
dants even though defendants had violated 
the terms of the modification agreement 
(R. 67) • It is conceded by plaintiffs 
15 
that they were not able to comply with 
the terms of the modification agree~ent 
but they have alleged (R. 58 at paragraph 
23) that their failure to comply was 
caused by defendants' interference with 
plaintiffs' contract with Wasatch, which 
allegation has not been denied by defen-
dants. By so interferring, defendants 
breached paragraph 4 of said agreement 
(R. 68) and, therefore, the delivery of 
the quit claim deed (R. 84) by Richard L. 
Bird, Jr. was ineffective and no title 
passed to defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, 
plaintiffs ask that this Court decide 
that a claim upon which relief can be 
16 
granted has been pleaded by plaintiffs 
and that tnis matter should be remanded 
for further proceedings at the Trial 
Court level. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Carvel R. Shaff er 
Thomas R. Blonquist 
of and for 
BURTON, 3LONQUIST, 
CAHOON, MATHESON & 
SHAFFER 
Suite 640 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
